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ASBTRACT 
 
The growing role of innovation in the strategy of car manufacturers leads them to 
relentlessly look for new sources of differentiation. In this way Telematics, a suite 
of technologies centered on communications systems within cars,  is expected to 
bolster the car industry by offering a new stream of revenues. This articles 
focuses on the impact of this technology on design organization. In the first part, 
we demonstrate that Telematics is a radical innovation for automotive industry. 
Therefore  traditional design models, such as heavyweight project management, 
are unsuitable. Next, the paper studies the organization adopted by a european car 
manufacturer in the light of recent research on the management of innovation. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The New Information and Communication Technologies (NICTs) have for 
several years constituted a very fertile field for innovation with the proliferation 
of initiatives relating to telematics services for automobiles, or the 
“communicating car”. These terms refer to the motorist's ability to access, from 
the vehicle itself, a certain number of services, which are customarily grouped in 
four areas: 
1. Emergency breakdown service: a localized call for breakdown service in 
the event of a problem, the automatic triggering of SOS assistance in case 
of an accident, and remote maintenance; 
2. Navigational aids: navigation, plus guidance to amenities and points of 
interest (i.e. parking facilities, tourist attractions, hotels); 
3. Communication services: telephone, sending/receiving of e-mail, 
videoconferencing and the like; 
4. Entertainment or so-call “infotainment”: i.e. hotel reservations, online 
shopping, games for passengers, creation of a personal jukebox and so on. 
 
Design and exploitation of such services involve various actors in complex 
cooperation processes. Service providers generate the information needed for the 
service (for example traffic information) and operate the service platform (for 
example the emergency call center) ; telecom operators develop and maintain the 
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communication systems that connect the car to the service operators ; car 
equipment suppliers develop the onboard systems needed for the service (for 
example integrated radio, GPS and GSM equipment) ; car manufacturers specify, 
integrate and market the new services and onboard equipments. 
 
The first commercially available application, Onstar, was launched by GM in 
1996, and other manufacturers quickly followed suit: BMW with Passo (1997) 
and then Assist (2000), Renault with Odysline (1999), Ford with Wingcast 
(2000), Fiat with Connect (2000), and Mercedes with Tele Aid (2001). The 
outlook today appears uncertain and ambivalent. On the one hand, massive 
projections are still being put forward despite the collapse of the Internet sector. 
The Frost & Sullivan firm has evaluated the market for automotive telematics 
services at 8.5 billion euros in 2007 and predicts a 15% growth rate beginning in 
2003, while the Forrester Institute estimates that 30 million vehicles will be 
equipped in the United States between now and 20052. On the other hand, GM – 
with its claim of 2000 subscribers3 – is the only manufacturer that has achieved a 
certain degree of success as far as concrete results are concerned; at the other end 
of the scale, European manufacturers are experiencing great difficulties. Even the 
frontrunners count only several hundred subscribers (Fiat), while several projects 
were discontinued in 2001 (Renault's Odysline) or profoundly restructured (PSA 
Peugeot Citroen). And looking beyond the distribution of these innovations, the 
strategic and financial benefits of injecting massive investment into this field of 
innovation remain very uncertain for manufacturers. 
 
The thesis that we will defend in this paper is that telematics services constitute a 
field of innovation representing a definitive turning point for the automotive 
industry – a turning point that was, for a moment, obscured by the euphoria 
generated by the Internet. Consequently, an aggressive strategy in this area 
implies the adoption of management tools specifically adapted to the collective 
learning process required in this field of innovation. 
 
The first section will deal with the specific parameters of the field of innovation 
constituted by automotive telematics services. We will define five problematical 
areas, as related to the traditional processes of innovation in the automotive 
industry: the strategic duality that underlies telematics innovations; the 
importance for the car makers to organize learning process of customers and 
distribution networks; the opening up of the product and the automotive industry 
to other business sectors; the synchronization of service innovations with 
traditional product cycles; and the problems raised by the uncoupling of 
knowledge acquisition from product development. 
 
In the second part, we will analyze the innovation-based management models 
capable of supporting an effective development strategy in this field. We will 
rely, first of all, on the theoretical references proposed by recent research in 
intensive innovation management ([1], [2]) and, more specifically, on the concept 
of “ innovative-supply project” management ([3], [4]). Secondly, we will draw on 
a research project currently being conducted with a European automobile 
manufacturer, here referred to as TelCar, which conducted Telematics project 
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since 1998 . This research, based on the principles of interactive research ([5], 
[6]), gives us the opportunity to conduct an in-depth ex-post analysis of the 
Telematic Platform (TP), an organizational tool created by Telcar in 1998 to 
manage the development of these new services. 
THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF TELEMATICS SERVICES AS 
RELATED TO TRADITIONAL FIELDS OF AUTOMOTIVE 
INNOVATION 
 
Our objective in this section is to characterize the field of telematics services 
from the point of view of innovation management theory. We will show that, 
when compared with the traditional areas of innovation in the automotive 
industry, this field is characterized by profoundly original characteristics, which 
can be summarized in five points: the strategic intent, the role of the customer and 
of the distribution network, the timescale applicable to the field of innovation, the 
opening up of the automotive industry to other (very different) business sectors, 
and, finally, the necessity of undertaking the acquisition of expertise 
simultaneously with product development.  
 
The strategic and semantic duality of telematics service innovations 
 
The term “service” is polysemous, meaning that it can be used in at least two 
different ways: 
- Meaning no. 1: the term “Services” refers to an economic category 
designating non-material products (communication and transportation 
services, the hotel industry, etc.); 
- Meaning no. 2: the term “Service” designates the entire body of services 
furnished to a customer before, during and after the purchase of a product 
(which may be material or non-material in nature) to facilitate or improve 
the use of the product by the customer (financing, advice, warranty, 
technical assistance, after-sales service etc.). 
 
The two meanings are obviously not exclusive. To provide a service (meaning no. 
2) generally involves non-material activities that could be classified as “services”, 
(meaning no. 1). Vice versa, “services” (meaning no. 1) include a significant 
amount of “service” (meaning no. 2): for example, the hotline of a software 
company (logically, this could be seen as a “service of a service business”). But 
on the other hand, these two meanings do not totally overlap: who has not 
experienced, at one time or another, a service (meaning no. 1) accompanied by a 
lack of service (meaning no. 2)? 
 
The field of “telematics services” goes right to the heart of this duality of 
meanings. Onboard telematics open a door to the automobile becoming a medium 
for service activities as defined in meaning no. 1: mobile communications, online 
shopping and so on. Onboard telematics can also be a medium for service (as 
understood in meaning no. 2) in the use of the automotive product (breakdown 
assistance, maintenance support for the car, navigation aids etc.). And this service 
(meaning no. 2) can rely on and/or generate service activities as understood in 
meaning no. 1 (e.g. traffic information service providers).  
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This characteristic presents, on the one hand, a significant opportunity for 
innovation, inasmuch as this field can be a meeting place for the strategies of 
various participants: business sectors interested in the exploration of new fields of 
technical innovation, product experts seeking to improve their customer 
relationships, equipment manufacturers, and telecom professionals (technical 
consultants, operators, content providers etc.). 
 
On the other hand, this characteristic can be problematical, since it can be a 
source of confusion and misunderstanding over the objectives pursued by the 
various participants cooperating in the venture. Two different strategic outlooks 
underlie current initiatives in the area of telematics services: 
• The first continues the innovation strategies that have been known to drive 
the automobile market for a decade ([7],[8]): the aim is to provide a 
distinguishing “value-added feature”. Service innovations, with their 
attendant technical equipment, are only an additional developmental stage, 
in the tradition of the airbag, ABS, the keyless car etc. 
• In the second strategic vision, the key element for manufacturers is not 
targeted on the product's competitiveness, but rather on the effectiveness 
of the commercial relationship between the company and its customer 
(which can be measured by customer loyalty rates, marketing costs and so 
on), an area that up until now has been relatively untouched by the waves 
of rationalization undergone by the automotive industry. In fact, it has 
been shown (see Table 1) that the automotive sector is one of the 
segments in which it is very difficult to set up a lasting customer 
relationship, due, first of all, to the infrequent nature of transactions (one 
buys a car only rarely) and, secondly, to the presence of an intermediary 
that acts as the interface between the customer and the manufacturer. 
 
Interaction with the customer Types of customer 
interaction  Direct Indirect 
High Banks, retail settings, telecoms 
Airlines, packaged 
goods, drugs Frequency of 
interaction Low Internet infrastructure Furniture and auto manufacturers 
Table 1 – source: [9] 
 
Many books and articles (see [10], for instance) have emphasized the importance 
of customer relationship management (CRM) to a firm's competitiveness. In this 
context, the communicating car becomes a means of establishing a richer and 
more continuous relationship with customers by offering them services that set up 
a direct relationship with them beyond the act of purchasing the vehicle. It thus 
becomes possible to better understand the uses they makes of their cars, and 
therefore to continually adapt proposed products and services, with the services 
being easier to implement due to new vehicle design cycles. The setting up of this 
type of direct relationship between the manufacturer and its customers takes on 
added importance in light of the radical restructuring of automotive distribution 
([11]), which is calling into question the principle of exclusive distribution rights. 
 
In principle, and stated in a general way, these two strategic outlooks appear very 
similar and entirely compatible : the car manufacturer can launch an innovative 
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equipment (radio/CD coupled with GSM and GPS, for instance) that 
simultaneously support new services used to improve his CRM strategy. But in 
fact, the two strategies implies different priorities for the project teams : 
- Thus, the speed with which the conspicuous onboard equipment in a 
car can be put on the market is a key point for the first viewpoint (with 
the result that partnership choices are centred on the equipment rather 
than on service providers), while, in the second outlook, redefining the 
customer-brand relationship is emphasized, which presupposes the 
setting up of an entire infrastructure for the use of the information 
within a CRM context. 
- Similarly, there are differing economic equations associated with the 
two strategies: the first strategy is based on a traditional economic 
argument, given the context of selling innovative equipment; in the 
second viewpoint, the economic repercussions are more indirect, but 
also more lasting (i.e. increased return on selling costs or improved 
customer loyalty). 
 
The user learning process and the exploration of technical solutions must 
occur simultaneously 
 
One of the most reiterated characteristics of service businesses is the importance 
of the particular role played by the customer. More precisely, we would 
emphasize, with [12] and [13], that: 
- The service is co-produced by the provider and the buyer; 
- This service co-production is consumed instantaneously, while products are 
put into inventory; 
- The quality of the service cannot be evaluated apart from the context of its 
production/consumption – we sometimes speak of “experiential products” 
(the perceived quality of a hotel's check-in service cannot be disassociated 
from the moods and particular habits of the customer or the time available 
to him on that particular day to carry out the transaction etc.). 
 
This has a major effect on the importance of customer involvement in the design 
process for innovative services, on the one hand, and of the personnel with whom 
they interact in the service relationship, on the other (i.e. distribution networks, 
call centre representatives etc.). To be sure, understanding and anticipation (since 
we're talking about innovation) of the customer dilemma is a common concern of 
all innovation processes, whether they are product-oriented or service-oriented. 
But the idea of involving a business's customers in the design process is much 
more radical and original4 [14],[15]. 
 
The aim of these new approaches is to structure the learning curve required for 
the use of future services by customers at the same time as the manufacturer's 
technical solutions, and the organizational processes capable of supporting them, 
are developed. 
 
However, in the automotive sector it is customary, on the contrary, to “push” 
innovations onto the market, with the assumption that the learning curve for 
innovative products is not a problem and can be resolved by traditional means of 
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which have been amply demonstrated with regard to the generation of significant innovation. 
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communication (i.e. advertising, informational campaigns). This type of approach 
is indeed appropriate when innovation results in a simplification of the use of the 
automobile, for example, or when the product takes over more and more 
functions that previously required the driver to possess a degree of practical 
knowledge, causing the driver, in turn, to become increasingly passive (i.e. 
various types of assisted devices or processes, passive protection systems etc.).  
 
Such an approach also works when the innovation consists of incorporating 
applications that were developed elsewhere – particularly those destined for 
domestic use – for further use in the automobile [16]. The development of 
onboard audio systems is a good example of such a situation: the transfer process 
allowed customers to take advantage of the learning curve already achieved 
elsewhere. Moreover, this approach significantly reduces the risks associated with 
the customer's view of the value to be attributed to a new feature, as well as 
significantly easing the penetration of these innovations in the automotive sector 
(since the building of public awareness and learning stages can be eliminated). 
 
However, it is a completely different story for the types of new feature found in 
advanced telematics systems (i.e. navigation aids, tourist information, links with 
manufacturer after-sales networks, fleet management etc.). The importance of the 
learning curve for customers and sales personnel is today one of the major 
difficulties encountered in the deployment practices currently in use for 
innovative products or services because traditional new-product marketing 
methods, which are implicitly based on public awareness and a customer 
competence level that have not yet been achieved, are called into question [17]. 
 
The problems currently being encountered can be summed up by two major 
difficulties: 
- Defining the innovative service – The list of possible services is 
potentially quite large, ranging from traditional roadside assistance to 
hotel reservations, traffic information and e-mail services. The concrete 
implementation of these services offers the opportunity for a variety of 
solutions, between which it is difficult to choose in principle (What type 
of control interfaces are needed? Should priority be given to voice 
interfaces? How does one reconcile onboard intelligence services with the 
services provided by GSM? Etc.); 
- Assigning a value to the innovative service – This is primarily a problem 
that stems from the fact that customers “do not know what they are 
buying” and, with the exception of a few technology buffs, they are not 
willing to pay extra for it. But the problem also stems from the fact that 
the economic models for these services are new for the automobile 
industry: subscriptions, pay-per use, the involvement of third-party 
financing and so on. There is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the 
costs associated with these services since they involve lasting 
commitments to processes that depend on a high level of customer 
initiative, which cannot be easily controlled. This can result in situations 
that might appear paradoxical, where certain services are launched for 
their image value alone with the hope that they don't “take off”, because a 
deficit would result from their full deployment. 
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The need to open up the automotive industry to the world of 
communications and services 
 
The car differs significantly from public transportation, which gives priority to 
collective prerogatives over individual travel. The notions of autonomy and 
independence are firmly rooted in the history of automotive products and within 
the industry itself. Improved reliability and increased product life are making 
drivers increasingly independent of the after-sales network. Manufacturers are 
used to exerting their control and integrating, as far as possible, all of the 
components required for their development. This explains the influence of 
manufacturers on upstream suppliers as well as on the development of financing 
subsidiaries, for example. To date, the economic weight of the manufacturer has 
greatly facilitated this strategy, with the corollary that innovations likely to call 
this paradigm into question tend to be eliminated. 
 
The field of telematics services constitutes a major exception to the underlying 
logic of autonomy and isolation of the western automotive world. 
- The very idea of the communicating car puts the accent on the link (and 
thus on the interdependence) between the individual automobile 
environment and back offices or various other service-providing 
communities. 
- The question of the boundaries of the automobile as an object and its 
interfacing with other technical systems is one of the key problems of 
automotive telematics. Should the industry attempt to absorb and 
completely incorporate emerging technical systems in order to convert 
them to "onboard" systems? Or, on the contrary, should it rely on mobile 
technologies (i.e. mobile phones, portable computers) and open up the 
automotive system by creating the most effective interfaces possible? 
- With the implementation of these systems, automobile manufacturers are 
confronted with the necessity of cooperating with other major economic 
players operating in other sectors, which they cannot hope to dominate. 
Such is the case with computer technology, electronics and telecom 
operators: it is widely acknowledged that, as far as electronic components 
are concerned, the automobile market is a minor player, when compared 
with the mobile phone market, for example. For this reason, 
manufacturers are experiencing great difficulty in influencing standards to 
accommodate the specific needs of the automotive product (in terms of 
reliability and security of supply, for example). 
- On the other hand, telematics services require the manufacturer to 
cooperate with the somewhat “non-capitalistic”, heterogeneous and 
unregulated world of content service providers (e.g. traffic information, 
tourist guides etc.). 
 
To continue with their traditional stance of isolation and self-containment is to 
relinquish the opportunity to become an aggressive player in the field of 
innovative telematics services. But by adopting this new strategy, they are 
opening a Pandora's box in the area of image and brand liability by implementing 
a system that is no longer entirely under their control. The customer is likely to 
blame the manufacturer for the poor reception of the onboard telephone system, 
or for the unreliability of the traffic info provided by the active navigation system, 
or for billing errors in online purchasing. From a legal standpoint, will some 
companies prohibit, for example, any form of communication while driving ? 
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Will lawmakers intervene in this debate? What is the manufacturer's liability in 
the event of service failure? And so on. 
 
The synchronization of service innovations with traditional product cycles 
 
Automotive innovation processes are locked into product lifecycles, and changes 
tend to coincide with new model dates. In the 1990s, the heavyweight model [18] 
exerted a strong influence, with the result that product-development timing 
constraints became the single most important factor driving the diverse energies 
of the company and its suppliers [7]. A sense of project urgency was instilled in 
companies and constituted a powerful tool for the mobilization of manpower [19]. 
 
The development of service innovations introduces a different temporal outlook: 
- Telematics services do in fact rely on onboard equipment, which is included 
in the traditional automotive product development process. But modification 
cycles in the areas of computer and electronic technology change much more 
quickly than in the automotive sector. The synchronization of these cycles can 
give rise to some paradoxical situations: the customer may end up buying 
onboard equipment, at a higher price, that offers a lower level of service than 
a mobile device. 
- Onboard equipment alone, when it is necessary, is not the only factor to be 
considered, since the provision of services also depends on external support 
structures (regardless of whether we are talking about hardware, software or 
content). Situations can thus arise where the onboard equipment is “in 
advance” of the available services, due to regulatory measures, for example, 
or to the lack of a commitment from telecom operators on the subject. 
- One of the strategic challenges in the realm of automotive service innovation 
is, as we have seen, the establishment of a positive and more continuous sales 
relationship with the customer. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that, 
after the initial purchase, the new car customer hopes never to see the dealer 
again, because when it is necessary it is more often than not to remedy some 
sort of damage or failure (a breakdown, an accident or the like) and it is 
usually costly. The introduction of new services provides the opportunity to 
reintroduce a positive element into the relationship with the manufacturer 
outside of the context of a new purchase. This obviously presents a parallel 
with the computer world, where successive software versions do not entail the 
purchase of new hardware, but contribute to it in accordance with a product 
inflation process, which the customer has a hard time avoiding. If the 
automotive industry is to commit itself to such an approach, with its attendant 
commercial advantages, it must appropriate a new point of view, one that the 
computer industry is already quite well acquainted with: the ability to set a 
value on the service that is independent of the physical hardware that makes it 
possible; the ability to manage the upgrading of existing equipment and to 
master compatibility problems between different generations of equipment; 
the ability to mobilize the company around the promotion of the less physical 
and more central sphere of accessible services; and so on. 
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The problem raised by the uncoupling of expertise acquisition from 
product development 
 
Project management for products has been structured in such a way as to 
uncouple the elimination of major uncertainties (i.e. the role of advanded 
engineering) from the development of projects relying on a solid knowledge base 
that has been developed in strategic areas of expertise. Our prior comments make 
it clear that this uncoupling is particularly problematical in the development of 
telematics services, where it would seem, on the contrary, that product 
development and the establishment of an upstream knowledge base cannot be 
separated:  
- In traditional projects, a strategy statement precedes and provides a 
framework for the implementation of the project. As we have seen, this 
type of pre-established exploratory framework is difficult to implement 
for innovative strategies, quite simply because there is no common 
vocabulary or understanding of the phenomena and causalities, and such 
would be necessary for a consistent and stable strategic statement. 
Strategic dialogue on the communicating car has played an important 
motivational role for companies in a field that is quite foreign to the 
dominant corporate culture of the automotive industry. However, their 
limited ability to establish these frameworks became quickly apparent, 
giving an impression of ambivalence involving many U-turns. 
- When dealing with innovative applications, the marketing of new products 
or services is a prerequisite to the creation of expertise, which must be 
based on the way these services are received and accepted by customers. 
- With the uncontrollable proliferation of technology providers, 
experimentation is unavoidable, even at the risk of a high probability of 
failure. It then becomes necessary to make the best of such failures by 
capitalizing effectively on the lessons they provide. 
 
Here again, the development of telematics services offers a good example of the 
need for a close association between the acquisition of new knowledge and the 
development of new products and services. 
 
THE TELCAR TELEMATICS PLATFORM, A PROTOTYPE EXAMPLE 
OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INNOVATION-BASED 
STRATEGIES 
 
What kind of organization would be capable of driving the exploration of such an 
innovative field ? Project management for product development has been deeply 
changed in the late 80’s and 90’s ([18]). But those evolutions would appear to be 
ineffective, since it is no longer possible to specify in advance either the 
objectives to be attained or the course the project should take. Some recent 
researches suggests guidelines for more appropriate tools.  
- The “lineages” concept [1] & [2] emphasize the dynamic structuring of 
repeated product innovation strategies and of learning curves regarding 
technical and functional concepts and fields of knowledge, but leave wide 
open the question of how these should be transformed into organizational 
and interfirm cooperation tools.  
- “Innovative-supply project management” was defined and tested in our  
previous research [3] & [4] to fill this gap. We formalized generic 
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principles to manage this highly risky projects [4], and the on-going work 
with TelCar, gives us the opportunity to test the relevance of these generic 
principles. We used it to analyze the organizational tool set up by Telcar 
to manage an ambitious innovation-based strategy in the field of 
telematics. In this part, we shall detail the preliminary results of this 
analysis, which focuses on one specific example, the telematics platform 
(TP).  
- The “Co-learning” concept [16] formalizes these new inter-firm 
cooperation situations. In co-development processes the partners are 
focussed on the achievement of an explicit ex-ante target. In “co-learning” 
situations, the scope of the cooperation is to explore a large and fuzzy 
space of potentially valuable features as technology roadmaps. Co-
learning situations implies then different contractual arrangements as 
management practices for ruling the cooperation. 
 
The Telematic Platform 
 
In December 1998, TelCar decided to set up a dedicated structure to organize the 
development and marketing of telematics services. The TP has brought together, 
in the same location, approximately twenty people representing different 
department of the firm (marketing, IT, electronics, purchasing, product line 
management, services etc.). The TP has its own budget and operates under a 
single manager. This platform has a multi-faceted mission:  
- it is charged with maintaining a technology watch over Telematics,  
- it is responsible for defining specifications for future telematics hardware 
and services, anticipating problems concerning the building of equipment 
into vehicles, and even identifying suppliers that are likely to participate 
in this field.  
- Finally, it must coordinate initial implementation of the first services.  
In the following sections, we describe and we analyze the running of the TP in the 
light of our theoretical framework.  
 
Principle 1: The sphere of action and evaluation reference parameters 
must be defined. 
 
The first problem with this type of project is in defining its sphere of action and 
the reference parameters that will be used to evaluate it. One major risk is that 
such projects may be seen as just a plethora of studies, each emanating from a 
different part of the organization, with the whole never being considered as a 
coherent entity on which much may depend. Declaring something to be an 
“innovative-supply project” leads, on the contrary, to a collection of studies into 
techniques and their applications being regarded as a single entity in order to 
build a progressive overall grasp of the field in question (utilization, technical 
solution, partners, legal problems etc.). The difficulty then is to manage this 
portfolio, in which each study is carried out not only for its own sake but also for 
its contribution to the whole. 
 
The setting up of the TP conforms to this vision. The existence of this situation 
within TelCar provided the conditions for an innovative exploration in a field that 
essentially cuts across all boundaries – those of projects, skills, products, time 
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constraints, and more. It takes into account the interdependence of the various 
dimensions of the learning curves, as well as the fact that the learning curve of 
telematics services cannot be treated as a juxtaposition of independent 
development projects (which would justify a whole series of standard project 
organization applications). However, at the same time as it plays out its 
commando role in an emerging field, this type of set-up must work with existing 
entities, which will subsequently use and build upon what has been learned. The 
TP was in a position to cooperate with other parts of the company, which leads us 
to look at the various existing means of cooperation with other parts of the 
organization (technical departments, commercial structures, and so on). In the 
TP's case, there was an "outer circle" made up of representatives of technical 
departments and product lines. Members of this group were heavily involved in 
the subject while still remaining attached to their original departments: they were 
often at the platform and participates to the “Telematic plenary”, the weekly 
meeting organized by the TP manager to check-up the course of the project. Also 
included were management structures set up by the manufacturer to handle all 
questions connected with telematics. These structures usually draw in participants 
from a more senior level in the hierarchy, although for the most part on a strictly 
part-time basis. The members of the "outer circle" have a dual role, which is 
essential since they constitute a key link in the "attachment" of the platform to the 
company. On the one hand, they are the representatives of the product lines and 
the technical departments within the platform. Wearing this hat, they complement 
the skills brought together in the inner circle by supplying the expertise of their 
own departments. Their contribution also includes clarifying the policies and 
constraints that must be built into the platform for its actions to be acceptable to 
the rest of the company. On the other hand, they are the representatives and 
channels of communication from the platform to the technical departments and 
product lines, and thus participate in disseminating the TP's activities within their 
own spheres. 
 
While it clearly illustrates the first principle of a unifying organizational identity 
focused on a single concept, our analysis of the TP also reveals how difficult it is 
to preserve a balance between focusing on the emerging concept and maintaining 
cooperation among the various elements present. Our research in fact showed 
that:  
• As far as bringing together the various initiatives was concerned, the TP could 
hardly be said to have drawn in certain strands initiated prior to its creation; 
• As far as the involvement of key skills was concerned, the fields of services 
and distribution were underrepresented compared with technical skills. 
 
Principle 2: The performance of investigations has a dual nature: the 
products developed and the knowledge accumulated both have value. 
 
Each element of the portfolio thus combines the process of knowledge production 
with the process of creating revenue. A management tool must therefore take 
these two aspects of performance into account (see rows and columns of Fig. 2). 
A study can therefore progress to the marketing stage without providing any new 
knowledge apart from the fact that there is an immediate market for the 
component in question. Conversely, another study might not go on to produce 
any revenue but may nonetheless generate crucial knowledge for understanding 
the technique or for defining its potential field of application. As a function of the 
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knowledge acquired, technical uncertainties are reduced and tests to be carried 
out become clearer, as do the potential applications – and, bit-by-bit, the 
investigations converge, or stop if the technique proves to be less useful than was 
previously thought. 
 
From here on in, if this principle is taken into account, the traditional view of 
performance is modified. What counts is not simply the revenue hoped for from 
each study, nor even the sum total of the short-term projected cash flows, but 
rather the growth in the return from each iteration of the investigation. When the 
management system succeeds in organizing this capitalization and these transfers, 
the average return of the portfolio increases, with each project contributing not 
only through its own results but also through the experience from which 
subsequent projects will benefit (the objective of "increasing average return" of 
the project portfolio [3] & [4]).  
 
This kind of management is essential in the front line of emerging technology, 
where the risk of failure is great because of the one-off nature of the strategy. The 
way the TP is defined accords perfectly with this philosophy of integrating a 
diversity of experiments in the strategy of investigating the field 
comprehensively. This strategy will enable progressive specification of the goals 
to be attained in terms of matched technical solution/practical value pairs (see 
rows and columns of the following diagram). 
 
Studies Customer's sector Service 
definition 
Technical 
options 
Etc. Outcome 
Study 1     
Study 2     
…     
Study n     
Results 
of 
studies 
Outcome Knowledge drawn from studies that can be used elsewhere  
 
Figure 2: The dual nature of the performance of studies in the portfolio of an innovative-
supply project 
 
Principle 3: Testing plays a central role in management. 
 
Unlike development projects, which make use of the company's knowledge base, 
innovative-supply project typically suffer from much greater uncertainty. Neither 
the potential of the technique nor its future applications are known, which makes 
ab initio predictions on the course of the project quite illusory. Sketching out a 
plan of action must therefore be seen as a temporary grid over the field to be 
explored, allowing the learning process to begin. 
 
In this context, the design of the tests that will prove or disprove the initial 
hypotheses occupies a crucial place in the management of the project. This is a 
key coordination element, inasmuch as no other timescale is applicable, unlike 
with development projects. In addition, it is a way of creating knowledge (and 
surprises!) that could radically change the direction of the investigation, whereas 
in development projects the main purpose of testing is to confirm the validity of 
the proposed solutions. The intensity of the learning experience will depend on 
the ability of the team to generate, carry out, and learn from a continuous flow of 
tests over a period of time. Here we come back to the theories of innovations 
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[20], [21] & [22], which underline the need for action where there is no clear 
preference; said action will enable the discovery of both problems and solutions. 
And, indeed, the history of the TP is littered with such experiments, which, while 
using relatively modest means, enable testing of the projected services 
(prototypes on test rigs, experimentation using simplified versions of the services 
to be provided based on temporary agreements with various partners etc.). 
Principle 4: An investigation should be focused in time. 
 
Innovation-based strategies take place in an extremely dynamic competitive 
environment. Practical values, strategies and technologies keep changing during 
the investigation process. Answers that are satisfactory at a given moment are no 
longer adequate a short time later, since questions evolve as they are being 
studied! Handling the various investigations sequentially therefore increases the 
risk that a partial answer, which is adequate at one moment, will no longer be so 
when the other facets of the problem have been resolved; consequently, the 
project is constantly drifting. This being the case, whether the project comes to 
fruition or not depends on the speed of the investigation and on the 
synchronization of a solution in the area of marketing and technology. In 
accordance with this principle, an investigation strategy where all the studies are 
scheduled to run in parallel would be of much greater value than an investigation 
where they are scheduled consecutively. This is the same notion as concurrent 
engineering ([7],[18]) but the aim is not so much a shorter time-to-market (a key 
argument in low-uncertainty developments) as an increased probability of success 
(breaking the synchronization between the "technical" and "marketing" aspects 
increases the risk of their never converging). 
 
Telematics services are typical of this situation. That is why the platform's 
mission covers everything from exploring the field to marketing new services. It 
is in fact now well established that the validation of the first ideas to be developed 
plays an essential role in the design of innovative solutions [1] & [3]. In any case, 
the role of the platform will evolve from phase to phase : 
• The platform assumes the leadership role in the initial stages, which consist 
of: 
- Exploring the field of innovation "defined" by the driving concept of a 
"telematics service" (What services are possible? What technical lines of 
attack can be envisaged?); 
- Sorting out which of these strands fit in best with the company's overall 
strategy. Here, the role of the tool is to prepare and organize the decision-
making paradigm of the sorting process, which should be confirmed by 
company management representatives (technical, production and 
marketing departments etc.); 
- Preparing the solution (once the concepts have been defined), by 
designing “halfway solutions” [8] that correspond to potential applications 
and have been through a validation process proving them suitable to be 
put forward as a credible proposal to the project teams. 
• The leadership role then passes to the technical groups and project teams for 
the final development stage, although the platform continues to monitor the 
implementation in order to prepare future services. This is in fact the time 
when problems with implementing the concept are discovered, factors that 
will enable subsequent versions to be improved. 
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The major difficulty here is to strike a balance between these two roles. Two 
kinds of drift are in fact possible:  
• The first is a drift towards pure "research". In this case, the platform comes 
to be seen as a technology-watch tool, relatively isolated from the 
development stage. However, we have seen that contact with the practical 
side is crucial for the improvement of successive generations of applications. 
The platform's own experience has shown how difficult it is to draw in the 
technical people if the solutions that have been developed are not sufficiently 
"mature" or "tried and tested". 
• Conversely, the project can veer towards the development side by taking over 
the whole process of perfecting both services and equipment instead of 
leaving this to the traditional development projects. This problem was clearly 
observed on the TP, which, having noticed how technical uncertainties had 
plagued the vehicle project teams, took over the development of onboard 
hardware intended to handle future telematics services. The extent and 
difficulty of this development task rapidly shifted the centre of gravity of the 
TP's activities from a “federating pre-project phase” position in the field of 
telematics services to the position of developing an individual product. 
 
Principle 5: Problems should be constantly reformulated. 
 
"Traditional" project management directs all efforts toward a predefined goal. 
This fifth principle predicates a different conception heuristic. To start with, 
investigations are guided by a set of requirements that may be the evaluation of a 
specific technology or, on the other hand, the fulfilment of a customer's need. The 
process of seeking an answer will generate knowledge that may well call into 
question the relevance of the original question or requirements. An investigation 
is not a simple tracing of the route from a single question to a single answer; it is 
the exploration of a matched question-and-answer pair, which may change as 
time goes on. 
 
A perfect illustration of this situation is provided by the history of telematics 
within TelCar. The strategy of the company in this area became progressively 
clearer between the two underlying visions that we identified in the first part. The 
slump in the value of dot-com companies also had a profound effect on the 
hypotheses and the conditions that had enabled the first operational steps to be 
taken. One of the aspects of a work in progress is to analyze how the 
organizational tools simultaneously enabled prior anticipation of the possibility of 
such splits and extraction of the maximum possible benefit from the work already 
done after redefinition of the strategy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Telematics services constitute one of the major areas of innovation for the future 
of the automotive industry. However, our analysis shows that organizations that 
have performed well in the efficient development of innovative vehicles and 
components are ill equipped to grasp the opportunities in this field. Various 
research projects now make it possible to give a better definition of management 
models appropriate to a context of intensive innovation: dual-function teams at 
Tefal studied by [23] a model of technical integration [22]; technical networks at 
  15
Renault [8]; and reorganization of research into a platform structure [24] or into 
“lineages” [2].  
The Telematics Platform tried out at TelCar constitutes an organizational 
prototype, which broadly confirms the theoretical model of the project 
management of “innovative-supply project” that we have described in another 
context [3]. It illustrates the need to set-up a dedicated structure to manage the 
exploration of a “field of innovation” ([2]) that cut across traditional firm 
boundaries (department, project, time constraints…). But, at the same time, our 
research reveals some weaknesses. Firstly we explain the difficulty to involve the 
different departments concerned by the innovation (especially the distribution 
networks) or to take in projects initiated before the creation of the TP.  Secondly, 
we show that the TP drift toward pure development, partly because of problems 
with a supplier and partly because of the reluctance of project teams to support 
highly uncertain developments. This explains that the TP sometimes missed the 
schedule. Since the first telematic services will soon be released, the TP is at a 
turning point in his history. The follow-up research, which will consist of tracking 
the project through the coming year, will enable this intermediate result to be 
confirmed and refined. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1]  Hatchuel A. & Weil B. (1999), « Design-oriented organizations. Towards a 
unified theory of design activities », 6th International Product Development 
Management Conference, Churchill College, Cambridge, UK, July 5-6 
[2]  Le Masson P. (2001), De la R&D à la RID. Modélisation des fonctions de  
conception et nouvelles organisations de la R&D, Thèse de doctorat de 
l’Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris, décembre. 
[3]  Lenfle S. (2001), Compétition par l’innovation et organisation de la  
conception dans les industries amont. Le cas d’Usinor. Thèse de Doctorat en 
Sciences de Gestion, Université de Marne-la-Vallée, janvier. 
[4]  Lenfle, S. et Midler, C. 2001. “Innovation-based competition and the 
dynamics of design in upstream suppliers.” International Journal of 
Automotive Technology and Management n°3 
[5] Berry M. (1995), « Research and the practice of management : a french 
view », Organization Science, vol. 6, n°1, p. 104-116. 
[6] Lundin R.A. & Wirdenius H. (1990), « Interactive research », Scandinavian 
Journal of Management, vol. 6 n°2, p. 125-152. 
[7]   Midler, C (1993), L’auto qui n’existait pas, InterEditions, Paris 
[8] Weil B. (1999), Conception collective, coordination et savoirs. Les 
rationalisations de la conception automobile. Thèse de doctorat de l’Ecole 
Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris. 
[9]  Winer R. (2001), « A framework for CRM », California Management 
Review, vol. 43 n°4, Summer. 
[10] Peppers D. & Rodgers M. (1993), The one to one future, Doubleday, New-
York.  
[11] Navarre C. (2000), « La déconstruction-créatrice des réseaux de distribution 
sous l’impact des NTIC : le cas de l’industrie automobile en Amérique du 
Nord », Cahiers de recherche du GREGOR, 2000-05. 
[12] Grönroos, C. ( 1990), Service Management and Marketing : Managing the 
moments of Truth in Service Competition, Lexington Books, New York. 
  16
[13] Edvardsson, Gustafsson, Johanson and Danden (2000) New Service 
Development and Innovation in the New Economy, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 
Suède. 
[14] Von Hippel, E.(1988) The Sources of Innovation, Oxford University Press, 
New York.  
[15]Magnusson, P. (2001), « The Involvement of Customers in New Product 
Innovation », », 17th EGOS Colloquium, July 5-7, Lyon. 
[16] Midler (2001), « Product metamorphosis and organizational odyssey. Design 
system transition from car radio to in-car multimédia systems », 17th EGOS 
Colloquium, July 5-7, Lyon. 
[17]Acloque, B. Sauvegrain, E. (2001), “Accroître la vitesse de mise sur le 
marché d’un produit innovant, le cas de la navigation automobile”, Mémoire 
de l’option Ingénierie de la conception, Ecole des Mines de Paris. 
[18] Clark K & Fujimoto T. (1991), Product development performance, Harvard 
Business School Press. 
[19]Jelliman P. (1999), La fabrication d’urgence pour mobiliser une organisation 
sur une menace potentielle, Thèse de Doctorat de l’Ecole Polytechnique, 
spécialité Gestion, décembre. 
[20] Lynn L.S., Morone J.G. & Paulson A.S. (1996), « Marketing and 
discontinuous innovation : the probe and learn process », California 
Management Review, vol. 38 n° 3, Spring. 
[21] Van de Ven A., Polley D., Garud R. & Venkataraman S. (1999), The 
innovation journey, Oxford University Press, New-York. 
[22] Iansiti M. (1998), Technology Integration, Harvard Business School Press. 
[23]Chapel V. (1996), La croissance par l’innovation : de la dynamique 
d’apprentissage à la révélation d’un modèle industriel. Le cas Tefal. Thèse 
de doctorat de l’Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris.  
[24] Charue-Duboc F. & Midler C. (1998), « Renewing research management in 
project-oriented organization : the case of a global vaccine firm », Actes du 
colloque IRNOP III, Calgary, 6-8 juillet.  
 
 
